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Are Indiana’s Newly Expunged Convictions
Still Available for Impeachment?
GRAHAM POLANDO*
During trial, a litigant can, of course, impeach a witness with certain criminal
convictions.1 However, Indiana Evidence Rule 609(c), like its federal counterpart,
prohibits parties from introducing such evidence when “the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding that the person has been rehabilitated . . . .”2 Indiana,
however, has no procedure for annulment or certificates of rehabilitation—and,
until recently, had nothing resembling one.
To some fanfare,3 the General Assembly has recently enacted an expungement
provision.4 As courts begin to grant these expungements, it is only a matter of time
before their recipients will begin to testify.
Despite its intent, the expungement legislation fails to completely erase the past:
litigants seeking to attack the witness’s credibility may legitimately unearth an
expunged conviction. For example, they could personally know of the conviction,
as would frequently occur in a domestic relations case. Or they could easily obtain
the information online from services as innocuous as a local newspaper’s police
blotter.5 Litigants with this knowledge will undoubtedly attempt to use it.
Trial courts must decide, soon, whether Rule 609 prohibits such use—in other
words, whether the new expungement provision is an “equivalent procedure based
on a finding that the person has been rehabilitated.” This essay contends that it is
not—that courts should allow evidence of expunged convictions for impeachment
purposes, but should likewise allow a witness’s proponent to introduce evidence of
the expungement. To see why, we first turn to what the expungement statute
requires.

* Magistrate, Saint Joseph (Indiana) Probate Court. Lecturer in Sociology and Social
Work, Manchester University (Indiana).
1
See IND. R. EVID. 609(a).
2
Compare FED. R. EVID. 609, with IND. R. EVID. 609.
3
See, e.g., Vic Ryckaert, New Law Gives Rehabilitated Offenders a Second Chance,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.indystar.com/article/20130828/NEWS02/
308280087/.
4
These provisions’ exact parameters are, to understate matters, a moving target. As
discussed in infra notes 7–9, the General Assembly tinkered with the expungement
provisions after just one year. 2014 Ind. Legis. Serv., P.L. 181-2014 (effective July 1, 2014).
The Court of Appeals summarized the effects of this legislation in footnote two of its
opinion in Taylor v. State. 7 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. April 24, 2014). Even those changes
may not last: on January 8, 2014, Senator Randall Head introduced Senate Bill 164, which,
pending in committee as of this writing in June 2014, would enact further substantive
changes, the most significant of which for these purposes is discussed at infra note 9.
5
See Logan Danielle Wayne, The Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal
Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 253,
253–55 (2012); Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes
With the First Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in
the Digital Age?, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 123–24 (2010).
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Indiana Code 35-38-9 details the new expungement procedures.6
To secure an expungement, the convicted person must, by a preponderance of
the evidence, establish four elements:7
(1) the passage of time between the conviction and the expungement petition.
This time period varies directly with the seriousness of the offense, from five years
for a misdemeanor to ten years for a serious felony.
(2) that there are no charges pending against the convicted person. Given the
difficulty in proving a negative (especially in light of the statute’s geographical
indefiniteness), the prosecuting attorney presumably could rebut this contention if
necessary.
(3) that the convicted person has “paid all fines, fees, and court costs, and
satisfied any restitution obligation placed on the person as part of the sentence.”8
(4) that the convicted person has not been convicted of a crime during the time
period applicable to the level of offense (again, ranging from five years for a
misdemeanor to ten years for a “serious felony”). While this presents the same
“proving a negative” problem from the second requirement, the petitioner’s
testimony will presumably be more persuasive here. A person likely has
considerably more knowledge about convictions, which require his presence, than
charges, which do not.
Finally, the serious felony convictions carry an additional, fifth requirement: the
prosecuting attorney must consent in writing to the expungement.
For misdemeanors and minor Class D felony convictions, the court, once it finds
that the petitioner has indeed established the five conditions, must grant the
expungement.9 This lack of discretion weighs against labeling such procedures
rehabilitative; the court must grant the expungement even to a manifestly
unrehabilitated offender. For example, in his petition or at hearing, he could deny

6

Though the terms are often used interchangeably, the recently revised statute
correctly uses expungement when dealing with a conviction, and sealing when dealing with
an arrest or charge with a different result.
7
Ind. P.L. 181-2014 changed the standard from the 2013 statute’s “clear and
convincing” standard to the “preponderance” standard. The legislature also removed an
additional element present in the 2013 statute: that “the person does not have an existing or
pending driver’s license suspension.” 2014 Ind. Legis. Serv., P.L. 181-2014.
8
The 2013 statute required the person to have successfully completed his or her
sentence, but did not define “successfully,” which had led to litigation in very similar
contexts. See Pittman v. State, 9 N.E.3d 179, 184–85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a
petitioner seeking to “restrict access to” [rather than expunge] his criminal record did not
“satisfy any other obligations imposed . . . as a part of the sentence” when he “flagrantly
violated the terms of [his] probation” by committing a new offense). Ind. P.L. 181-2014
removed the requirement that the petitioner complete his or her sentence at all, much less
that he or she do so “successfully.” See also Taylor v. State, 7 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. Ct. App.
April 24, 2014).
9
Id. at 365 (“had the legislature intended the expungement of conviction records . . .
to be discretionary, it would have used the word ‘may’ instead of the word ‘shall.’”). Senate
Bill 164, which is pending as of this writing, would remove that mandatory requirement “if
the crime resulted in injury or loss of property to another person.” S.B. 116, 118th Gen.
Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014).
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his guilt, disclaim the law’s legitimacy, or proudly say that the victim had it
coming.
Even for serious felonies, the court may grant the expungement, though the
statute does not specify how the court should exercise the apparent grant of
discretion. Presumably, the court will look to undisputed indicators of potential
rehabilitation, such as remorse or positive community service. But even here, the
court may legitimately exercise its discretion in favor of an unrehabilitated
offender, as nothing limits the court’s discretion to rehabilitative factors: the court
may believe that the conviction’s prejudicial effect (especially for sex offenses)
outweighs its informational value to the public, or that the offense’s subsequent
downward reclassification does as well.
Even if a court concerned itself solely with rehabilitation in reviewing potential
expungements, it is not entirely clear what the term means. In The Shawshank
Redemption, Morgan Freeman’s character Red famously refers to rehabilitation as
a “made up . . . politician’s word.”10 Indeed, though an oft-encountered term in the
criminal law, it appears nowhere else in the Rules of Evidence. In K.M. v. State, the
Indiana Court of Appeals deliberately declined to define the term: “‘beyond
rehabilitation’ has not been defined in our case law. We believe that the reason for
the lack of a definition is that the determination of whether a juvenile is beyond
rehabilitation is fact sensitive and can vary widely from individual to individual
and circumstance to circumstance.”11 This seems obvious—rehabilitation
(whatever it means) must depend on the nature and circumstances of the committed
offense.
If rehabilitation depends on specific facts, the Indiana expungement provisions
do anything but acknowledge facts. Courts lack the discretion to deny
expungements for any non-serious felony, and even serious felonies require only a
period of non-offending (and, in one case, prosecutorial consent). The General
Assembly clearly intended the expungement procedures to provide a streamlined
process to decide relatively objective questions—and rehabilitation is far from
objective.
Indeed, even if, as seems plausible, the General Assembly wished to encourage
or recognize the general rehabilitation of a particular class of non-recidivists, Rule
609(c) directs the Court to focus on the individual, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit emphasized in interpreting the Indiana Rule’s federal twin:
“Rehabilitatory motive alone, however, is insufficient to trigger Rule
609(c). The Rule requires ‘a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted.’ Thus, courts have consistently upheld introduction of prior
convictions under Rule 609 where the convictions were later expunged,
even where the statute authorizing expungement was motivated by
rehabilitation.”12
If the Indiana Rule requires an individual focus, then, perhaps our courts should
exclude impeachment evidence when the expungement provision allowed for such

10
11
12

THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Columbia Pictures 1994).
804 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
United States v. Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
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a particularized determination—that is, when the Court had discretion to grant or
deny the petition.
This test has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. In Smith v. Tidewater Marine
Towing, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s admission of an impeachment
conviction despite the fact that it had been the subject of Louisiana’s first-offender
pardon provision.13 The court distinguished such convictions from those in which
the trial court had discretion to grant or deny the petition, apparently reasoning that
such discretion would necessarily include a rehabilitation assessment. Because the
first-offender pardon was automatic, no court could have denied it even to a clearly
unrehabilitated offender. Applying that Fifth Circuit test to Indiana’s expungement
law would mean that expungements of misdemeanors and minor Class D felonies
are not based on rehabilitation (because the court shall grant them), but serious
felonies are (because the court may do so).
As might be obvious, this standard relying only on whether the expunging court
had discretion leads to bizarre results when applied to Indiana’s provisions. The
test would allow a party to impeach a witness with a less severe conviction, but
could not do so with a more serious one. Moreover, while the assumption that
courts will use their discretion to assess rehabilitation is reasonable, it is far from
necessary.
If the rule requires a rehabilitation determination and the statute only
occasionally provides one, perhaps trial courts could conduct their own assessment.
In United States v. Thorne, the Eighth Circuit approved just such a procedure.14
Though the testifying witness there had three prior felony convictions (none of
which had been the subject of any sort of procedure), the court affirmed the trial
court’s finding of rehabilitation. The trial court apparently conducted a summary
rehabilitation hearing and declared the witness rehabilitated. Thorne, then, provides
a potential alternate test: the court faced with the evidentiary issue may provide the
party seeking to prohibit the impeachment with the opportunity to present evidence
of rehabilitation and, presumably, the party seeking to introduce it a chance to
show evidence of non-rehabilitation.
Thorne, however, has been rightly criticized as an expansive reading of Rule
609(c).15 While its ad hoc rehabilitation tribunal may have been a procedure, it was
far from equivalent to the more formal pardon or certificate programs the Rule
contemplates. The hearing lacked any standard or burden of proof for determining
rehabilitation—indeed, the Court of Appeals expressly disapproved the very reason
the trial court gave for making its finding (a desire to preserve the witness’s ability
to testify in the future). Courts might indeed be reluctant to recess their own
proceedings to conduct an entirely separate inquiry into the Defendant’s

13
927 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1991). Louisiana’s Constitution granted all “first offenders” a
pardon “automatically upon completion of [their] sentence.” Id. at 840, citing LA. CONST.
art. 4, § 5(E)(1).
14
547 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976). For an excellent discussion of this and other federal
cases, as well as state analogues to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, see Andrew Hacker,
Comment, The Use of Expunged Records to Impeach Credibility in Arizona, 42 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 467 (2010).
15
See Zinman v. Black & Decker, 983 F.2d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 1993).
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character—presumably with attendant provisions for discovery, evidence, and
argument.
Most importantly, individualized rehabilitation determinations frustrate the
expungement statute’s purpose. Given the fact-sensitive nature of rehabilitation, the
court would likely have to receive evidence on the crime’s circumstances and the
convicted witness’s attempts to remedy them—the very evidence the General
Assembly intended to forever bury.
Given that the expungement provision’s square peg fits uneasily into Rule 609’s
round hole, courts might be tempted to bypass the Rule’s ambiguous “equivalent
procedure . . . based on rehabilitation” language in favor of the familiar balancing
Rule 403 requires. Though relevant, the court could exclude expunged impeaching
convictions on the ground that they would unfairly prejudice either the testifying
witness or the party calling the witness. This approach has some support in the case
law: the passage of time is a key component of the expungement provision, and it
seems clear that “the probative value of a prior conviction on the issue of
credibility tends to decrease with the passage of time.”16
But the Rule already addresses such concerns (albeit somewhat bluntly) by
presumptively excluding convictions after ten years. The expungement statute
should not (indeed, constitutionally cannot) subvert the Rules of Evidence by
prescribing a shorter time period for all but the most serious felonies. More
importantly, one can easily imagine scenarios in which the impeachment value of
the conviction is highly probative despite its expungement.
To take an extreme but perfectly plausible example, imagine a police officer
who knowingly offers perjured testimony in a grand jury proceeding investigating
that officer’s use of deadly force. The prosecutor uncovers the officer’s deception,
charges him with perjury, and, pursuant to a plea agreement, allows him to plead to
the lesser (misdemeanor) offense of false informing.17 The officer openly expresses
a lack of contrition. Nevertheless, after five years, he applies for expungement,
which the reviewing court has no discretion to deny. Soon after, he yet again faces
a grand jury investigation into yet another use of deadly force. That prior
dishonesty, while highly prejudicial, is also indubitably relevant.
The General Assembly has, however, prohibited “any person” from
“discriminating against any person because of a conviction . . . expunged or sealed
under this chapter,”18 and commanded that “a person whose record is expunged
shall be treated as if the person had never been convicted of the offense.”19 If the
General Assembly has determined that the prejudice to the convicted person
outweighs its general probative value to the public, that determination would seem
to apply specifically in court.
However, the extraordinarily broad command that beneficiaries of the
expungement statute “shall be treated as if the person had never been convicted of

16

U.S. v. Shapiro, 656 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1977).
The expungement statute specifically prohibits courts from expunging perjury
convictions. See IND. CODE § 35-38-9-3(b)(4). However, it allows expungement for any
misdemeanor. See IND. CODE § 35-38-9-2 (expungement for misdemeanors); IND. CODE §
35-44.1-2-3(d) (defining misdemeanor false informing).
18
IND. CODE § 35-38-9-10(a)(6).
19
IND. CODE § 35-38-9-10(d).
17
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the offense” raises serious concerns about overbreadth. Read literally, it would
prohibit a young woman from leaving her boyfriend on learning that he had a
criminal past, or a prosecutor from complying with the Rules of Professional
Conduct by disclosing his own witness’s prior expunged theft conviction.20 More
significantly for our purposes, it imposes obvious restrictions on any litigant’s
(especially a criminal defendant’s) right to present his or her case. Imagine a court
denying a defendant during the penalty phase of a capital trial the opportunity to
introduce a prosecution witness’s prior perjury conviction.
It seems, then, that so long as the conviction is otherwise admissible under Rule
609, trial courts should allow impeachment with expunged convictions. We are left
with one final role for the expungement statute: following impeachment, could the
court admit evidence of the expungement so the calling party could (ironically
enough) rehabilitate the witness—if not in character then in credibility?
Generally, the circumstances surrounding an impeaching conviction are
inadmissible for the reason mentioned above: while courts can easily adjudicate a
conviction’s existence, they understandably wish to avoid a “trial within a trial” on
that conviction’s minutiae. But if a court can readily determine a conviction’s
existence, certainly it can just as easily adjudicate whether it has been expunged.
We then come to the question of the expungement’s relevance.
An expungement does not necessarily reflect positively on its recipient. But, for
the necessarily limited issue of credibility, the mere fact of expungement seems at
least as probative as the mere fact of conviction. If we are looking only for readily
determinable facts bearing on credibility, an expungement would seem as valuable
as a conviction. The weight to be given to each should be for the finder of fact to
decide, as it already is for the conviction.
In short, Rule 609 recognizes that criminal convictions bear on credibility, but
that subsequent rehabilitation matters as well. Indiana’s expungement provisions
are agnostic about rehabilitation, and therefore should not bar evidence of the
underlying conviction—but the expungement may, in itself, have probative value.
Courts should therefore admit evidence of expunged convictions, but should
likewise admit evidence of the expungement itself.

20

Even if the prosecutor knows the Rules of Evidence exclude the conviction, the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics & Professional Responsibility has interpreted Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 to require the prosecutor to disclose any impeaching
material so the defendant and his counsel can assess its potential evidentiary value. ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009). See also R. Michael
Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment
Disclosures, 64 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1429, 1452–54 (2011).

